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452 ; nor do we think, because a vessel described as a steamboat
in the process of building, while yet on the stocks, and known as
such to both the insurers and insured, may be covered by a policy
when such a descripfion is used, that any such construction can
be permitted when the vessel is already navigating our rivers by
steam.
It would seem to be a singular coincidence that the steamer
Admiral, to which the machinery and appurtenances taken from
the Sioux City were removed, was lost by the ice at the same
time the remains of the latter vessel were destroyed.
I There .cannot be, nor is there claimed to be, any pretence to
recover for the loss of that machinery, though it was once covered
by the policy; and a like rule should be applied to the loss of
the hull.
The plaintiff has been unfortunate, but his remedy against the
defendant was gone when his vessel ceased to be a steamer.,
There is a clause in the policy by which it is covenanted that the
steamer should, during the continuance of the risk, be sufficiently
"found in tackle and appurtenances." This was urged by the
counsel of defendants in his argument, but we suppose it is but
the statement of what the law'would require without any express
stipulation.
It was the necessary result of the express warranty that the
vessel was a oteamboat.
On the whole case we find no error in the judgment of*the
Court at Special.Term, and it is therefoie'affirmed.
Fox and TAFT, J., concurred.,
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AGENT.

Book Account.-It is the duty of an agent; when the nature of tle
business of his agency requires it, to keep an accurate account of his

payments apd disbursements, and to render at all proper times an
I From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in Vol. 5( of h:s Reports.
2 From W. G. Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 40 Vt. Rep.
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account thereof to his principal "without concealment, suppression, or
overcharge :" Gallup v. Nferrill, 40 Vt.
The neglect of an agent to render a specific and accurate account to
his principal when required, is not a bar to an action in favor of the
agent to recover a balance due him from his principal, but, as a matter
of evidence, it raises a presumption against his claim: Id.
ATTORNEY.
Service upon.-As a general rule, when"an attorney is employed, all

papers in the cause must be served upon him, instead of the party. The
only exception to this rule is where the object is to bring the party into
contempt: Flynn v. Baiey, 50 Barb.
Where an order required that if the defendant refused to refund certain moneys within twenty days after service of a copy, a judgment
should be set aside and vacated, but did not require a personal service
upon the defendant: HeZd, that a service upon his attorney was sufficient: Id.
BItLS AND NOTES.
Revenue Stamp-Original Consi&ration.-In an action of geheral
.sumpsit, the payee .of a promissory note, having no revenue stamp
affixed thereto, and if, for that reason, invalid, can recover of the maker
upon the original consideration for which such note was given: Wilson
v. Carey, 40 Vt.
Trover-Evidence.-The defendant purchased the note in question of
his daughter, who told him that B., to whom she was betrothed, and
who was a soldier in the army, gave it to her. He had also seen a
receipt in her possession;.signed by her, stating that she had received
the note of B., and was to account for it on demand, and a promise to,
pay him or bearer. At B.'s death this receipt was found in the hands
of S., who was a depositary of B.'s papers. 1eld, that this knowledge
of the receipt was not alone sufficient to put the defendant on inquiry
in respect to his daughter's title to the note, but he was a bona fide
holder: Benoir v. Paguin, 40 Vt.
The holder of a note, as security for moiiey lent, is not chargeable
with a wrongful conversion of it by refusing to deliver it up, until the
person claiming it pays, or offers to pay, the amount for which it is held:
Id
The county court having ruled that the title to the note was in B.,
and his administrator, and the defendant being thereby left to stand
exclusively upon his transaction with his daughter, she was a competent
witness, not being within either the terms or intent of the statute excluding, as a witness, a living party to a cause or contract in issue whero
the other party is dehd: Id.
CARRIERS.
Ziability for Baggage.-The undertaking of a carrier of passengers
is. that he will carry the passenger and his trunk to the place of destination, and deliver the same, with its contents, to him there, on presentation of his check for it, within a reasonable time, under the circumstances, after arriving: Jones v. The Norwich and New York Trans
portation Cc, 50 Barb.
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Where a traveller by- steamboat neglects to present bis check and
claim his baggage within a reasonable time after the arrival of the boat
at the end of the route, the carrier becomes a mere gratuitous bailee"
and if the baggage is afterwards destroyed by fire, without any negligence on his part, he is not liable for the value: Id.
Where a traveller by steamboat, on reaching the end of one of the
stages of her journey, not wishing to be troubled with her trunk, intentionally abandoned it to the care of the carrier, without any inquiry
about it, or presentation of her check, or explanation, special arrangement, or notice, for about seventeen hours, while she left the boat and
went about three miles to visit a friend; and during that period the
trunk with its contents were accidentally and without negligence on the
part of the carrier,. destroyed by fire, in a baggage-room on the dock,
into which it had been removed by the carrier's employees.
that
the carrier was not liable for the value of the trunk and its contents:
Ml.
Herd, also, that the statute of Connecticut, prohibiting the doing of
any secular work, or travelling, on the Lord's day, did, not vary or affect
the question of the carrier's liability; and that it furnished no excuse
for the traveller leaving her trunk in the manner she did, on Sunday
morning, without .any special arrangement for its keeping, until her
return on Monday, and without notice to the captain, baggage-master, or
other employee of the carriers: Id.

Hed,

CONTRACT.

Statute of.-Fraucls-Damages---Sale.-Where,under a verbal contvact of sale of 1900 bushels potatoes, one car load was received and
paid for, this took the contract out of the Statute of Frauds as to the
entire contract as originally made, notwithstanding the defendant had
previously written the plaintiff to purchase no more for the defendant:
Danforth & Co. v. Walker, 40 Vt.
The plaintifi however, had no right, after receiving the letter, to purchase potatoes and then recover for loss sustained on them by frost and
rot. His damages as to such- after purchases, must be limited to the
difference between the price the defendant had agreed to pay the plaintiff, and what it. would cost the. plaiintiff to procure and deliver the :
Id.
If the potatoes wre to be delivered in good condition, and no, tinie
was stipulated within which the defendant was to take them, he would
have a reasonable time for that purpose, and would not be liable for loss
occasioned by freezing or rot before such reasonable time had elapsed:
Id.
Soldiers' Bounfy-Towns-Evience.-It is a- rle in the construction of contracts that any contract is to be-construed with reference to
its object-so that effect may be given to the intention of the parties
-when ascertained: Johnson v. Town of Newfane, 40 Vt.
A town having voted to pay a bounty to those who should enlist under
an existing call for troops and apply on its quota, is bound to pay to
those who enlisted, previous to the votej but were mustered in subsequent
thereto-they having had the right at the time of muster to be credited
to any town they chose: Id.
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On the 30th of November 1863, the defendant town voted to "raise
$300 for every volunteer that may enlist previous to the 5th day of January
next under the last call of the President for 300,000 volunteers." And
it was further voted "that the selectmen be authorized to borrow a sum
of money, not exceeding $3000, to be paid $300 to each recruit when
mustered into the service of the United States." The town had eleven
men to furnish under that call. The plaintiff enlisted November 13th,
and was mustered in December 1st 1863, to the credit of said town, and
with the expectation at the time of enlistment that he should receive
the same -bounty that the town might pay to others, otherwise he would
not have enlisted or been mustered in to the credit of that town. The
selectmen had notice of his enlistment and claim for bounty prior to
said meeting. Held, that he was entitled to recover the $300 bountyand that evidence as to his expectation was properly received: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Evidence.-On the trial of an'indictment against a husband for
administering poison to his wife, with intent to kill her, thewife may be
admitted as a witness for -the prosecution. And bping a competent witness, there is no rule by which any part of her testimony should be excluded: The People v. Northrup, 50 Barb.
DAMAGES.
Threatening letter.-To warrant an action against one for writing a
letter giving information wilfully false, and with the malicious design of
annoying the plaintiff, and frightening him out of town, the loss or
inconvenience sustained must be the direct and reasonable result of the
letter and of a reliance upon it, and must consist of something more
than mental suffering or annoyance. The letter in this case would justify
neither anxiety nor expense: Taft v. Taft and Wife, 40 Vt.
DEED.

Covenant as to mode of Building upon, or using Premises.-The
acceptance, by the grantee, of a conveyance containing a covenant by
him, his heirs, and assigns, as to the manner of building upon, or using,
the premises conveyed, is equivalent to an express agreement on his
part, to perform the covenant; and the obligation affects the title of his
grantees: The Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 50 Barb.
Where the covenant was, among other things, not to erect or permit,
upon the premises conveyed, any brewery, distiller, slaughter-house, or
"other noxious or dangerous trade or business," and the defendants, in
one ase, had erected a manufactory for the distillation of train-oil, and
in the other, a manufactory for the production of paraffine; in both
cases the building and machinery being like those usually employed in
the distillation of alcohol, and the evidence showing that such distillation might be accomplished' by means thereof. Held, that the defendants were disabled by the covenant from erecting or maintaining such
buildings or machinery; and that it was not necessary, in order to show
a breach thereof, to prove an actual use of such buildings and machi.
nery for the purpose of a distillery; that it was enough that they might
be so used; and that a breach was committed before an actual use: Id.
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Held, also, that if the buildings in question were not distilleries,
within the meaning of the covenant, they fell within the prohibition
against "other dangerous trade or business -" Id.
EVIDENCE.

Waiver of' Oections to.-Where no objection is made to evidence on
the trial, and no exceptions taken to its admission, it seems the court will
not reverse the judgment, even though satisfied. that the evidence was
originally inadmissible. The party should be held to have waived the
objection by not raising it at the trial: Voorhis v. Voorhis et al., 50
Barb.
EXECUTORS.

" "Where an executor has received a portion of the estate, and sold the
same; and applied the money arising from the sale to his own business,
thereby commingling it with his own -property, and preserving no evidence by which the trust fund can be identified;. in the distribution of
the assets of such executor, after his death, by the surrogate, no preference can be allowed in favor of the trust estate on account of such
moneys, but the estate must stand on a footing with the other creditors
of the executor: Barlow, r.ecutrix, &c., v. Yeomans, Adm'r., &c., et al.,
50 Barb:
FIXTURES.

" Windows and Blinds.-Double windows made for a house, fitted to
its window casings, not nailed or fastened in, but held only by being
closely fitted 'nd pushed in, which remained in through- one winter until
warm weather when they were taken out and set away in the house, and
blinds made for side lights and set up in the hall, but never fitted to the
windows or put in, both windows and blinds not being intended by the
grantr to pass with the house, but secreted so that the grantee did not,
at the time of purchase, know of their existence, and there being nothing
about the casings to indicate that any double windows belonged thereto.
Held, not to pass by deed of the -premises, they never having been
actually or constructively annexed to the house: Peck v, Batchelder,
40 Vt.'
INJUNCTION.

To stay e~ectic of a Tax.-The equity powers of the Supreme
Court cannot be successfully invoked, to stay or prevent the assessment
or collection of a tax: Messeck v. Tie Board of upervisors of Columbia Count, 50 Barb.
INTEREsT.

ljon an unluidated Demand.-The rule, as modified by recent
4ecisibns, allows interest upon an unliquidated demind, the amodnt of
which could be ascertained by computation, together with a reference to
well-established market values, because such values are so nearly certain
that it would be possible for the debtor to obtain some proximate knowledge of how much he is to pay: S!p erly v. Stewart, 50.Barb.
JOINDER.

Of Causes of Action.-aA cause of action for the recovery of money

-
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coilected upon a judgment regular on its face, and not. for a tort, is improperly united with a cause of action to recover damages for an alleged
false imprisonment of the plaintiff, where it does not appear satisfactorily and clearly from the complaint, by a proper statement of the facts,
that the causes of action arose out of the same transaction. A mere
general allegation that they so arose, is not enough: FlT'nn v. Bailey,
50 Barb.
The provision of the code requiring that the complaint shall contain
a plain and concise statement of the facts which constitute the cause of
action, applies to each'count of the complaint; and the general allegation that the second cause of action arose out of the transactions connected with the first, does not establish a case within the above rule: Id.
-

SALE.

PersonalProyerty-Atemorandum-ParolEvidence.-The defendant
sold the plaintiff a farm, together with certain farming tools and other
personal property, and executed a memorandum of such sale of the personal property, in which many articles were enumerated, and concluding
with these words: "Meaning all the farming tools, &c., now owned by
him (the defendant), and on said farm." Held, that parol evidence was
admissible for the purpose of ascertaining to what specific property these
words applied: Rvgg and Elliott v. Hale, 40 Vt.
Language in. a memorandum of sale, descriptive of the locality of
personal property sold, if incorrect, does not affect the validity of the
sale : Id.
Intoxicating Uguors-Stapage in transtu-Beylevin.-The right
of stoppage in transitu cannot be enforced by suit in this state as to
intoxicating liquors sold therein contrary to law, the statute having taken
away all right of action for the recovery or possession thereof: Howe
and French v. -Stewart, 40 Vt.
K:; who was insolvent, ordered at Johnson, Vt., of N., the agent of
H. & F., merchants at Boston, Mass., intoxicating liquors. -Upon the
receipt of the order from M., on the 21st day of January 1867, H. & F.
shipped the goods by railroad directed to K. Waterbury, Vt. After
Lheir arrival at their place of destination, they were put into the freight
depot of the Vt. 0. Railroad Co. On the 30th day of January 1867,
while the goods were in said depot, the charges for transportation not
having been paid, and before K. or any one in his behalf had exercised
any control over them, they were attached by the defendant, a deputy
sheriff, on a writ against K., as his property, but were not taken from
the depot. On the 5th day of February 1867, the attorney of the
plaintiffs notified the agent of the railroad company in charge of the
depot, the goods being still there, of their claim to stop them in transitu.
Hfeld, that the transituswas at an end, and that the plaintiffs' right of
stoppage in transitu had ceased: Id.
TENDER.

Pleading- Waiver-Interest.-The plaintiff having traversed a plea
of tender, and tried the issue of fact before the jury, cannot, after the
charge, insist that the defendant had no right to make such plea. and
thus try the question as to the sufficiency of the plea on exception to
the charge: darpenterv. Welch, 40 Vt.
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If a tender is received, though made subsequent to the time limited
by the statute for making it, it operates as a payment to the amount of
the sum so received, as of the time when made: Id.
In computing interest with annual rests; in the absence of any evidence of a different understanding between the parties, the first rest is
to be made at the end of one year, computing from the commencement
of the account, and so from year to year: Id.
TROVFR.
Conversion-Deositi6t.--Whereone obtains possession of another's
property, though lawfully, and sells it, believing it to be his own, the
sale is a conversion: forrim v. Houlton, 40 Vt.
The adverse party notified to be present at the taking of a deposition
las not two hours after the time named in the citation to make his
appearance, but the magistrate may proceed at once. The statute limits
the right of the magistrate to proceed to the condition of his being
present within two hours of the appointed time; Id.
USAGE OR CusToM.
Evidence of a general usage or custom, in a particular locality or
business, is not suicient to charge a party, where there is no proof that
he knew, or had even heard of, such usage or custom: ,iS erly v.
50 Barb.
Stewart,
A custom,
in order to beedme a part of a contract, must be so
far
established, and so far kniown to the parties, that it inust be supposed
that their contract was made in' reference to it. For- this purpose the
custom must be established, and not casual-uniform and not varying-'
general, and not personal, and known to ihe parties: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Tender of Bond and Mortgage by Purchlaser.-Where a vendof is
unable to perform his agreement to convey the premises free from all
incumbrances, for the reason that they are incumbered by mortgage, the
purchaser is excused from offering'to execute and delivef a bond and
mortgage for.the purchase-money: -arker v. Haverly, 50 Barb:
A tender of performance -need not be made when it would be wholIy
nugatory;- and the existence of an incumbrance at the time fixed in the
agreement -for the execution of a deed, is a breach of the -vendor's covenant, which puts it out of his power to perform, and excuses the purchaser from tendering performance: R.'
Waiver of Terformance.-Whe&e a vendor was at the place appointed,
with* the holder of a prior mortgage, who was 'ready to cancel such
mortgage as soon as payment should be made by the purchaser, and, such
mortgagee remained there until quite late in the day, when he left for
home, after which the money was tendered; and to the vendor's offer to
send for the mortgagee and get a satisfaction of the mortgage, the purchaser replied that he could not wait, or would not wait. Ield, that
this amounted to a direct waiver by the purchaser of any further effort
by the vendor to obtain the satisfaction, which precluded the former
fxom insisting, afterwards, that the latter had failed to perform Id
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